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DE RUEHVEN #0284/01 3521456  
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADF08A52 MSI5171-695)  
P 181456Z DEC 09 ZDS  
FM USMISSION USOSCE  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6771  
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY  
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY  
RHMCSUU/SACEUR POLAD SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUESDT/DTRA-OSSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY  
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RHMCSUU/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RHMFIUU/USAREUR POLAD HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS USOSCE 000284

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C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT PARA 8

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,  
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI  
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,  
NILSSON, FRIEDT  
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)  
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A  
TAGS: [KCFE](#) [OSCE](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [XG](#)  
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC: DECEMBER 2009 - END OF FALL SESSION AND  
AEMI

REF: A. STATE 93327

[1](#)B. DTG 082106Z SEP 09

[1](#)1. (SBU) Summary: This message constitutes an end of fall 2009 session report on the OSCE's Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). The last FSC plenary on December 16 denoted not only the end of the United Kingdom's FSC Chairmanship but also a review of the FSC's accomplishments and prospects in 2010 under Greece's FSC Chairmanship. Russian priorities and expectations for the 2010 FSC are also noted. We fully expect our efforts in 2010 to continue looking for ways to manage Russia's promotion of legally-binding European Security initiatives in the OSCE, with particular emphasis on "ways in which to strengthen the OSCE's politico-military toolbox." Russia's unrelenting attention to the Vienna Document, and now the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, is gaining momentum among delegates. We will actively continue to explore ways to facilitate Russia's positive contributions to the FSC. A summary on the Vienna Document 1999, Annual Exchange of Military Information is also provided below. We note that the Russian Federation and Tajikistan notified delays in their respective AEMI submissions. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan provided no VD99 data. End Summary.

The Final Plenary of 2009

[1](#)2. (SBU) At the December 16 FSC plenary, Russia (Ulyanov under Agenda Item I, General Statements) made an affable intervention calling the autumn session "fruitful and satisfying," singling out decisions on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), non-proliferation and the Athens Ministerial Decision on Issues Relevant to the FSC. Russia went further, praising the UK Chair as "the most effective and fair" since France's Chairmanship in 1999! Ulyanov said he was now "hopeful" that the FSC after the Athens Ministerial Decisions was now primed to overcome the "protracted deadlock" that had until recently characterized the forum, thus allowing the FSC

to "reacquire its status as the key European forum for discussion of hard security issues."

¶3. (SBU) Ulyanov listed Russia's priorities for 2010: 1) special sessions of the FSC emphasizing arms control issues within the framework of "current security conditions"; 2) a more informal, free exchange of opinions and arguments on the principles that manage inter-state relations with emphasis on the Code of Conduct; 3) an inventory of the OSCE's political-military toolbox including "first and foremost VD99"; and 4) attention to improve the procedures and mechanisms for settling conflict as was initially envisioned in the early 1990s but since disappeared from the FSC's "field of vision." Ulyanov concluded there was an enormous volume of work for the FSC in 2010, pledging Russia's close cooperation.

¶4. (SBU) Ukraine underscored its commitment to strengthen the OSCE's contribution to address WMD proliferation issues in 2010, following up on the just adopted Athens Ministerial Declaration on Non-proliferation. Ukraine specifically suggested the FSC consider a revision of the OSCE's Principles Governing Non-Proliferation Principles (DOC.FSC/6/96) as adopted at the FSC Plenary in Budapest ¶1994.

#### FSC Security Dialogue Autumn Wrap-up

¶5. (SBU) The Security Dialogue throughout the autumn session as chaired by the UK was dynamic. Besides sober briefings from (D/SACEUR) General McColl and (D/ISAF) General Dutton on Afghanistan, the FSC engaged in discussions on Gender Issues related to Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster

Munitions, and Non-Proliferation Issues, including 1540 coordination. There was intense discussion throughout the session on both Georgia-Russia issues stemming from the Tagliavini Report and on Russia's attempt to press forward a wholesale review of Vienna Document 1999. In contrast to Ulyanov's gracious remarks noted above, throughout the Fall Session Russia expressed clear disappointment in the FSC Security Dialogue as generally irrelevant with the sole exception of the occasional vitriolic exchanges between Russia and Georgia. Russia throughout the fall session also intermittently accused "some participating States" of deferring to other forums and venues any pertinent security discussions.

¶6. (SBU) At the opening of the UK Chairmanship in September, UK Security Policy Director Paul Johnston placed emphasis on further development of the FSC's Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) agenda. The FSC Decision 11/09 (Expert Advice on Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on SALW) and Ministerial Decision 15/09 (tasking the development of a Plan of Action among other activities) were solid accomplishments. The incoming Greek Chair already flagged for USDEL as early priorities development of an SALW Plan of Action and preparations for the Fourth Biennial Meeting of States on combating the illicit trade in SALW. Greece plans to circulate a "Food-for-Thought" paper on SALW before the end of the year.

¶7. (SBU) Non-proliferation assumed a larger role in the FSC's fall session, mainly due to UK and U.S. attention to UNSCR 1540 and related issues, including the initial contribution for a Best Practice Guide (BPG) on 1540 implementation (i.e., the U.S.-drafted chapter on Export Control and Transshipment) and efforts to establish an extra-budgetary position for a dedicated 1540 action officer within the International Secretariat. These efforts are ongoing and will require the U.S. and UK to continue not only close collaboration but also leadership. Nonetheless, though the Ukraine-sponsored OSCE Athens Ministerial Declaration on Non-Proliferation was both remarkable and organizationally a positive political statement, the core of the OSCE's role on Non-Proliferation is evolving and may require some heavy lifting in 2010 to keep it prominent on the agenda and appropriately balanced with efforts in the Security Committee in 2010.

The FSC yet to come

¶8. (SBU) In informal USDEL consultations with the incoming Greek FSC Chairmanship, Greece was frank about the limited capacity Athens brings to the non-proliferation agenda and also its reliance on the U.S. to take the lead in this area; we noted our interests to keep non-proliferation a prominent part of the FSC's agenda. Greece expressed willingness to provide political support as necessary. Nonetheless, we raised with Greece the importance of maintaining momentum both on developing additional chapters for the UNSCR 1540 BPG and the Security Dialogue on non-proliferation-related issues. Finding ways to build more inter-institutional interaction, such as invitations to IAEA and OPCW to brief the FSC, is under consideration but we note it may not get fully socialized prior to Hungary's turn as FSC Chair following Greece.

¶9. (SBU) Greece asked if the U.S. would be willing to discuss developments related to START-follow on negotiations and Missile Defense within the framework of the Security Dialogue. We noted that Missile Defense was an issue that had direct relevance to OSCE participating States and could bring in interesting points of view, especially if Russia were willing to make a contribution. On the other hand USDEL noted it could not commit to either request and it may be

premature to raise START in the OSCE unless it was in a broader context, such as discussions related to the NPT Review Conference. Nonetheless, we assured Greece that we would report its interests on these topics for consideration by Washington authorities.

¶10. (SBU) Greece plans to build on the UK's accomplishments as set forth in the Athens Ministerial Decision 16/09, Issues Relevant to the FSC. In a nuanced shift away from singling out Vienna Document 1999 for more in depth attention, Greece noted that the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was better aligned to the cross-dimensional aspects of European Security within the Corfu Process. Greece intends to make harmonization of the FSC's work and the Corfu Process a priority, acknowledging the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty as a divisive maneuver and a challenge to the integrity of current institutions and security regimes.

#### Annual Exchange of Military Information

¶11. (SBU) The December 15 AEMI will be remembered because Russia (and Tajikistan) failed to provide their respective VD99 data, citing delays for "technical reasons." Russia (Ulyanov) pointedly informed the U.S. (Neighbour) to reassure there were no political motivations behind the omission. (Note: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan provided no VD99 data, and Russia also failed to provide its "CFE-one-pager" for the first time in two years. End note.) Russia hoped it would submit its data at the latest by early part of the week of December 21. The U.S. submitted its VD99 data under cover of diplomatic note (Number 2009/061, filed as FSC.EMI/426/09) for the AEMI on December 15. The U.S. Defense Planning data was submitted under diplomatic note number 2009/060, filed as FSC.EMI/425/09. The U.S. submission of the Conventional Arms Transfer data (per State 127974; DTG 151445Z DEC 09) was conveyed by diplomatic note number 2009/062 filed as FSC.EMI/442/09.

¶12. (SBU) Comment: The 2010 FSC will need to find a way to manage balancing priorities between the whole of the political-military toolbox (important for developing deliverables for the Corfu Process). By our count that includes strengthening current arms control and CSBM instruments (i.e., Code of Conduct, SALW, and Non-proliferation will garner more attention), and the still-open issue of what to "do" with VD99. It will also continue to be a challenge to maintain balance among the new and emerging asymmetric or cross-dimensional security issues like cyber-security and conflict prevention and crisis

management. Russia will press in the FSC for a discussion on the conflict cycle from early warning to rehabilitation.

¶13. (SBU) (comment cont.) We also note that there are VD99 proposals still to be addressed in 2010, including:

1) Ukraine's Food-for-Thought on Interpretations of Some Provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 Chapter I, "Annual Exchange of Military Information" (FSC.DEL/196/09), which would cover deployed or non-resident combat units separated from their primary location. (NOTE: Ukraine acknowledged to USDEL their intention was to capture Russia's excess equipment, including aircraft, reported in last year's data as located in Ukraine, subordinated to Black Sea Fleet Units, but actually located on Russian territory. According to Ukraine Military Advisor Colonel Alex Taran, Ukraine accepted as valid Russia's declaration of 18 ACVs, six pieces of artillery, and two combat aircraft in excess of Black Sea Fleet limits. END NOTE.);

2) Turkey's proposal for use of digital cameras for to

improve compliance and verification under Chapter IX of VD99 (FSC.DEL/124/09/Rev.1); and

3) The reemergence of Denmark's proposal for a VD99-plus (the slightly-edited original version from June 16 was freshly circulated among NATO-T members on December 10).

¶14. (SBU) These outstanding VD99 related issues in light of the Ministerial Decision 16/09 attention to "strengthening" the document, suggests that effective and timely coordination among Allies is imperative if the FSC hopes to manage the Russian European Security Treaty initiative within the proper comprehensive framework. As the UK Chair (Gare) noted in final remarks at this last plenary of 2009, the prospects for the FSC's workload in 2010 is "frightening." End Comment.

¶15. (SBU) List of USDEL Reporting on Fall 2009 FSC issues: A) USOSCE 00198, DTG 100921Z SEP 09; B) USOSCE 00201, DTG 111531Z SEP 09; C) USOSCE 00205, DTG 220627Z SEP 09; D) USOSCE 00212, DTG 291123Z SEP 09; E) USOSCE 214, DTG 021133Z OCT 09; F) USOSCE 221, DTG 150638Z OCT 09; G) USOSCE 00224, 161347Z OCT 09; H) USOSCE 00235, DTG 221414Z OCT 09; I) USOSCE 00239, DTG 231306Z OCT 09; J) USOSCE 00245, DTG 301326Z OCT 09; K) USOSCE 251, DTG 101617Z NOV 09; L) USOSCE 00256 DTG 161644Z NOV 09; M) USOSCE 00260, DTG 201048Z NOV 09; N) USOSCE 00269, DTG 271005Z NOV 09; O) USOSCE 00274, DTG 110809Z DEC 09.  
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